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EXIT AND VOICE IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
Marc A. Rodwin*
Until the 1960s, the main way for patients to affect health care institutions was by
choosing their doctors or hospitals or leaving those with which they were dissatis-
fied. They had few avenues to exert their voice to bring about change through
complaints, politics, or other means. The balance between exit and voice shifted in
the 1960s, as the women's health and disability rights movements brought about
change by increased use of political voice and, to a lesser degree, by exit. With the
growth of managed care since the 1980s, enrolled individuals have had fewer op-
portunities for exit and greater potential to exercise voice to influence managed
care organizations. However, that potential has not yet been adequately realized.
Current debates about consumer rights focus on appeals of decisions by managed
care organizations to deny services. They generally ignore the role of members in
organizational policy or governance. This Article explores the relation between exit
and voice in American health care and its prospects for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the American health care system was character-
ized by fee-for-service practice, uncoordinated medical providers,
and a system of halfway markets and regulation.' Most individuals
were covered by indemnity insurance. Patients who were insured
were free to switch doctors, hospitals, and other health care pro-
viders when they were dissatisfied; but exiting did not necessarily
allow them meaningful choices, nor did it prompt organizations to
change. There also were few institutionalized opportunities to ex-
ercise voice. Most recipients of health care did not view themselves
as consumers, had few incentives to express their voice, and re-
mained unsure about where they should express their concerns.2
* Associate Professor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington, Indiana. B.A. 1977, Brown University; M.A. 1979, Oxford University; J.D.
1982, University of Virginia Law School; Ph.D. 1991, Brandeis University. This Article draws
on two previous publications: The Neglected Remedy: Strengthening Consumer Voice in Managed
Care, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 1997, at 45, and Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons
from Medical Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Move-
ments, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147 (1994). Thanks are due to Professor Walter Wadlington for
comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.
1. See Stuart H. Altman & Marc A. Rodwin, Hafway Competitive Markets and Ineffective
Regulation: The American Health Care System, 13J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 323, 324 (1988).
2. This Article applies the concepts of exit and voice developed in ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS
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Two significant consumer movements-the women's health
movement and the disability rights movement-changed health
care by strategic use of voice (complaints, protest, concerted politi-
cal activity) and exit (choosing alternative providers). Both
movements included individuals with long-term health concerns-
a status or illness that allowed them to self-identify and organize to
collectively express their voice and seek alternative providers.
In the last thirty years, government health policy has encouraged
two principal changes: 1) increased market competition (including
encouraging consumer choice as a means to make health care pro-
viders responsive) and 2) the growth of managed health care.
These changes have altered the problems consumers face and their
opportunities to use exit or voice.
Health care market competition has created a more dynamic
and turbulent health care delivery system. It also has expanded the
range of providers, the methods of treating illnesses, and the
choices available to consumers. At the same time, the growth of
managed care has restricted consumers to a set panel of providers,
thereby reducing exit options. Managed care has also created pro-
tocols which restrict the clinical choices available to physicians.
The result: exiting from one managed care organization (MCO) to
another offers consumers fewer clinical choices than in a fee-for-
service indemnity health insurance system. By coordinating care
the MCO becomes the responsible party, making it a natural and
appropriate target for complaints. There is greater potential for
activating consumer voice against the MCO than against a cluster
of independent and loosely coordinated hospitals and doctors.
AND STATES (1970). Hirschman contrasts the use of exit (leaving a firm or choosing an alter-
native product, a traditional market oriented approach) with voice, complaining or engaging
in concerted activity, a traditional political approach. His book shows how the two choices
interact and can yield different responses depending upon the circumstances. Hirschman's
book has spawned a significant literature in social policy. For a summary of recent use of
these concepts, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence, in
RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 77-101 (1986); R.B. Freeman
et al., Political Economy: Some Uses of the Exit-Voice Approach, AM. ECON. ASS'N, May 1976, at 361,
386-89; Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent
Contributions, 13 Soc. Sci. INFO. 7, 7-26 (1974), reprinted in 58 MILBANK MEM'L FUND Q.
HEALTH & Soc'Y 430, 430-56 (1980). For commentary on the implications of the exit-voice
concept, see Brian Barry, Review Article: "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," 4 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 79, 79-
107 (1974); A.H. Birch, Economic Models in Political Science: The Case of "Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty," 5 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 69, 69-82 (1975). For other discussions of exit and voice in
American health care, see Rudolf Klein, Models of Man and Models of Policy: Reflections on Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty Ten Years Later, 58 MILBANK MEM'L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC'Y 416, 419
(1980) [hereinafter Klein, Models of Man]; Paul Starr, Changing the Balance of Power in Ameri-
can Medicine, 58 MILBANK MEM'L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC'Y 166, 166-72 (1980) [hereinafter
Starr, Changing the Balance of Power]; Carl M. Stevens, Voice in Medical-Care Markets: Consumer
Participation, 13 Soc. Sci. INFO. 33, 33-48 (1974).
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Until recently, health policy focused on increasing exit options
for consumers in managed care. It promoted choice among MCOs
and the use of report cards to help consumers compare them. As
of the summer of 1999, however, interest is shifting toward ena-
bling the complaint and appeals process and providing
opportunities for consumers to express themselves. President Clin-
ton's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in
Health Care proposed a right for individuals to have their appeals
reviewed by neutral parties outside of the MCO. Several bills in
Congress and current state laws would accomplish the same end.
4
Some writers also are interested in expanding consumer voice in
MCO governance and operations. 5
I. EXIT AND VOICE IN INDEMNITY INSURANCE
A. Some Choice
In the past, most Americans who had private health insurance
were covered by indemnity insurance, and most doctors and hospi-
tals were paid a fee for each service rendered.6 Insurers would
reimburse the insured for the cost of medical services, minus co-
payments and deductibles paid by the individual.
Doctors and hospitals, loosely constrained by minimal regu-
lation, medical norms, and potential liability for negligence,
decided what therapies to use. Doctors enjoyed enormous clinical
freedom.7 Numerous studies of how physicians practiced indicate
wide variation in the basic approaches doctors used for common
3. See H.R. 358, 106th Cong. (1999). But cf Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1999, S.
1344, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing less favorable treatment of appeals for denial of serv-
ices and other consumer issues than the House version).
4. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EXTERNAL
REVIEW OF HEALTH PLAN DECISIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY PROGRAM FEATURES IN THE
STATES AND MEDICARE 1 (1998).
5. See MARC A. RODWIN, CONSUMER VOICE, PARTICIPATION, AND REPRESENTATION IN
MANAGED HEALTH CARE 1 (Consumer Federation of America White Paper, 1998) (available
at <http://www.spea.indiana.edu/mrodwin>) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) [hereinafter RODWIN, CONSUMER VOICE].
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1993) (enabling Medicare and Medicaid). The public sector
covered those over 65 years under Medicare and the very poor were covered by Medicaid.
7. Since the late 1960s, private and public insurers have used utilization review pro-
grams, with limited success, to ferret out and deny payment for unnecessary medical
services. See generally CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE: THE ROLE OF
UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Fields eds., 1989) (providing an
historical account and descriptive overview of utilization review programs).
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conditions." Insured individuals could choose their doctors and
hospitals, subject to the willingness of doctors to treat them, the
limitations of the market, state licensing laws, and medical
etiquette. There were few rules, yet few meaningful alternatives.
From the 1930s until the 1960s, medicine was a seller's market.
A shortage of doctors made it possible to give short shrift to pa-
tients' wishes and still maintain a secure source of patient revenue.
9
Patients' choices were also limited by information deficits, particu-
larly disparities in knowledge between doctors and patients.' °
Added artificial restraints exacerbated this restraint on choice.
Medical codes of ethics prohibited advertising professional fees
and facilitated other anti-competitive practices. Hospital rate set-
ting similarly constrained market restructuring, limiting new ways
of organizing and delivering health services."
In addition, scant published information was available about the
relative effectiveness of many therapies. Patients usually relied on
doctors to tell them what they needed. Aside from bedside manner
and reputation, patients had little basis for the choice of one doc-
tor over another. If a patient-doctor relationship turned sour, exit
might be a good move, but patients rarely had much information
about a new doctor, except by word of mouth. Patients had some
choice, but it was not well-informed as they had little information
to guide them.
B. Little Voice
Professional norms discouraged patient participation in medi-
cal decision making and limited patients' access to information.
As a result of training and tradition, many physicians were pater-
nalistic. They gave patients minimal information about medical
risks or alternative approaches. Jay Katz's history of informed
8. This literature was spawned by the work of Wennberg and Gittelshon. SeeJohn E.
Wennberg & A. Gittelshon, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 183 SCIENCE 1102,
1107 (1973) (describing Vermont's variations in health care delivery).
9. See generally RASHI FEIN, THE DOCTOR SHORTAGE: AN ECONOMIC DIAGNOSIS (1967);
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Manpower Forecasting: The Case of Physician Supply, in HEALTH SERV-
ICES RESEARCH: KEY TO HEALTH POLICY (Eli Ginzberg ed., 1991) (outlining a theoretical
model for forecasting physician supply and offering comments on historical statistical be-
liefs).
10. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 964-65 (1963).
11. See generally Altman & Rodwin, supra note 1.
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consent aptly described this situation as "the silent world of
doctor and patient."12
Not only were doctors silent, but patients had few opportunities
to express their voice. Medical and social norms encouraged pa-
tients to play a passive, sick role and to depend on doctors, not to
challenge them and risk straining the relationship." Patients like-
wise lacked incentive to complain-if they disliked the doctor, they
could switch to another.
If patients could not ask their doctor to change his or her behav-
ior, to whom could they voice their concerns? There was no
governmental authority to oversee the health care system. Patients
could complain of egregious conduct to state licensing boards, but
these boards had limited powers. Typically, licensing boards exer-
cised their power only to revoke or suspend the licenses of doctors
who had been convicted of criminal offenses or were impaired by
alcohol or drug use.' 4 Courts provided a forum for patients injured
by medical malpractice, but this was a very limited and costly form
15
of consumer voice.
The organization of medical care also impeded consumers from
expressing their voice. There was no entity responsible for coordi-
nating or overseeing health care to which consumers could
complain. The health care delivery system was fragmented, and for
most patients and doctors there were no organizations like HMOs
to oversee doctors or coordinate medical care. Hospitals exercised
only minimal control by granting doctors admitting privileges.
Patients also were not organized. They faced health care choices
as individuals. There was little in the way of institutions to amplify
their voice or purchasing power. Patients generally did not see
common quality problems stemming from the way medicine was
organized, nor did they typically view themselves as consumers.
When patients were dissatisfied, they generally attributed the prob-
lem to their doctor.
12. See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
13. See Talcott Parsons, The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered, 53 MIL-
BANK MEM'L FUND Q. HEALTH & Soc'Y 257, 266-71 (1975).
14. See ROBERT C. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED
STATES 77-85 (1969); RANDOLPH P. REAVES, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AND
CERTIFICATION 208-14, 225-30 (1984).
15. See generally PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE Di-
LEMMAS OF TORT LAW (1997) (providing an overview of tort and medical malpractice law
and policy); see also SYLVIA A. LAw & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF
MALPRACTICE (1978); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL IN-
JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
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II. THE SEEDS OF CHANGE: THE WOMEN'S HEALTH AND
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
Exit and voice in medicine were transformed in the 1960s.
Change came from social and protest movements outside of health
care." The civil rights movement of the 1960s brought a distrust of
the discretionary authority and paternalism of the medical estab-
lishment, as well as of such institutions as government, religion,
prison, and social work.I7 Disaffected groups wanted to participate
in decision making. Two social movements in particular-the
women's and disability rights movements'-focused attention on
health issues and sought changes in the way medical personnel and
institutions treated their members. Both movements combined
voice and exit to advance their goals. They engaged in protest,
politics, and publication to change the way professionals and the
public thought about issues and their standard practices. They also
created self-help groups and alternative institutions as a way to spur
change and seek control.
A. The Women's Health Movement
Women's groups felt that many of their problems were improp-
erly medicalized-women were not allowed to control their bodies
and were denied autonomy, notably in birthing and abortion. 9
16. For example, the Johnson administration's War on Poverty promoted "maximum
feasible participation" by citizens affected by federal programs in projects of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, especially community health centers. The aim was to make commu-
nity action programs responsive to residents. Statutes creating Health Systems Agencies for
health planning also relied on citizen/consumer participation. See National Health Planning
and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 98-641, 88 Stat. 2225, 2232-41 (1974);
see a!soJAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIM-
ITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 264-65 (1990) (discussing community health centers)
[hereinafter MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH]; DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDING 185 (1969) (discussing the Model Cities Program).
17. See DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 98-100 (1991).
18. Other factors also prompted change. There was a movement for patients' rights,
which used courts to change health care law and policy, and the growth of medical consum-
erism. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Karen Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). For a review of patients' rights abuses, see George J. Annas, The Hospi-
tal: A Human Rights Wasteland, CIVIL LIBERTIES REV., Fall 1974, at 9-29.
19. See THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES
138, 157 (1973).
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Women's health groups complained that physicians spoke conde-
scendingly to women and treated them as incapable of
understanding information or participating in medical care deci-
sions.20 The result, they said, was poor care provided in a
demeaning manner, which often reduced rather than improved
the quality of women's lives.
Women's groups wanted to change medical practice. In articles
and books they showed that medicalization forced women into a
"sick" role, with many unnecessary or even harmful medical proce-
dures performed routinely.2 2 Critiques of medical textbooks blasted
sexist images and statements. 23 Women's groups used the media to
criticize standard practices and clinical choices, and to suggest al-
ternative treatments. One of the most influential books was Our
Bodies, Ourselves, published by the Boston Women's Health Collec-
tive, a focal point for women's health organizing. An alternative
guide to health care and a critique of medical practice, the book
offered information on medical issues as an alternative and sup-
plement to that of traditional medical care. Eventually the views of
protesters became part of the discourse in such mainstream publi-
cations as McCall's.
The critique of medicine by the women's health movement
changed popular perceptions and even the standard practices of
medicine. For example, the Boston Women's Health Collective
worked with medical schools to change gynecological training and
to show medical students how to perform pelvic exams in a sensi-
26tive manner. Women's groups' use of voice was complemented by
20. See Mary Lynn M. Luy, What's Behind Women's Wrath Toward Gynecologists, 42 MOD.
MED. 17, 18-19 (1974).
21. See generally Catherine Kohler Riessman, Women and Medicalization: A New Perspective,
Soc. POL'Y, Summer 1983, at 3.
22. See BEATRICE S. LEVIN, WOMEN & MEDICINE 1-2 (1980) (noting how prescribing
estrogen and D.E.S. to women caused serious problems with little or no medical benefits,
and how prescription of those drugs continues); Mary Ann Elston, Medicine as 'Old Husbands'
Tales': The Impact of Feminism, in MEN'S STUDIES MODIFIED: THE IMPACT OF FEMINISM ON THE
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES 192, 195 (Dale Spender ed., 1981) (describing why the health
movement was important to women in the United Kingdom and citing as an analogous
analysis of the women's health movement in the United States BARBARA EHRENREICH &
DEIRDRE ENGLISH, COMPLAINTS AND DISORDERS: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF SICKNESS
(1973)).
23. SeeTHE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 19, at 22-23.
24. See generally SHERYL B. RUZEK, THE WOMEN'S HEALTH MOVEMENT: FEMINIST AL-
TERNATIVES TO MEDICAL CONTROL (1978).
25. SeeJudy Klemesrud, Why Women Are Losing Faith in Their Doctors, MCCALL'S, June
1973, at 76 passim (detailing the condescending attitudes of the gynecological profession
and observing changing attitudes in and outside the profession).
26. See Susan Bell, Political Gynecology: Gynecological Imperialism and the Politics of Self-Help,
ScI. FOR PEOPLE, Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 8.
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the creation of alternatives and the possibility of exit, as Women's
groups offered competing services and institutions. For example,
the Los Angeles Feminist Women's Health Center started as a self-
help group and became a significant alternative care institution.27
Some women's groups also evaluated doctors and hospitals, circu-
lating lists of those to avoid and those they recommended. Other
groups created networks of alternative providers. In Chicago, a
group called "Jane" organized an underground network that pro-
vided access to abortion before the procedure became a
constitutional right in 1973.2s By 1981 there were approximately
100 women's health centers in the United States.29 Women's
groups created classes and services on alternative approaches to
birth, including home birth and midwifery.
Some groups argued that women themselves, with the support of
nurses, midwives, and lay personnel, could address many health
care concerns. Catherine Kohler Reissman suggested increasing lay
women's control over their health outside of traditional medical
care institutions.30 Many women's groups advocated the use of
midwives. Women's groups preferred this alternative to hospital
birthing, where they saw women placed in a passive role by doctors
who controlled timing and process and frequently performed in-
appropriate cesarean section deliveries.1
In the wake of the women's health movement, medical providers
catered more to women. Some hospitals sought to capture part of
the alternative market by changing their standard practices. They
offered home-like birthing rooms and a birthing process more re-
sponsive to women's concerns.32 HMOs began marketing birthing
centers, albeit in hospitals. For example, the Marketing Women's
27. See RUZEK, supra note 24, at 169-72.
28. See id. at 25; "Jane," Just Call 'Jane", in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREE-
DOM: TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 93, 93-94 (Marlene G. Fried ed., 1990); Lindsy Van
Gelder, The Jane Collective: Seizing Control, Ms., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 83.
29. See Mary K. Zimmerman, The Woman's Health Movement: A Critique of Medical Entre-
prise and the Position of Women, in ANALYZING GENDER: A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH 442, 460 (Myra Marx Ferree & Bess B. Hess eds., 1983).
30. See Riessman, supra note 21, at 16-17.
31. See generally THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH (Pamela S. Eakins ed., 1980); Carol
Sakala, Medically Unnecessary Cesarean Section Births: Introduction to a Symposium, 37 Soc. ScI. &
MED. 1177, 1177, 1180--81, 1183 (1993).
32. See RUTHIE H. DEARLING ET AL., MARKETING WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE 58 (1987)
(examining established marketing theories and modifying them to provide guidelines for
specifically marketing women's health care programs); Nancy Worcester & Mariamne H.
Whatley, The Response of the Health Care System to the Women's Health Movement: The Selling of
Women's Health Centers, in FEMINISM WITHIN THE SCIENCE AND HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONS:
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE (Sue V. Rosser ed., 1988) (analyzing the increased marketing of
women's health care centers and elaborating on the necessity for centers meeting the needs
of all women).
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Health Care report stated that "catering to the maternity market
segment is critical to patient acquisition, not only for the maternity
department, but for other health services as well.
3
B. The Disability Rights Movement
Society has long stigmatized people with disabilities, warehoused
them in institutions, made them dependent upon service provid-
ers, discriminated against them in employment, and hampered
their access to public buildings and other facilities. 4 People with
disabilities felt marginalized and treated as second class citizens.
Starting in the 1960s, they protested, organized politically, and
sought civil rights.
People with disabilities objected to the way medical and other
professionals treated them. Professionals and custodians, they felt,
neglected their interests and concerns, particularly those involving
quality of life. 35 Disabled individuals confined to institutions were
restricted from living independent lives because of both their im-
mobility and their dependence on the schedules and goodwill of
professionals. Even when they lived outside of institutions, profes-
sionals still exercised control over important aspects of their
33. DEARLING ET AL., supra note 32, at 58.
34. For a review of disability policy in the United States, see EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ,
DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA'S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED (1987) (proposing that
disability policy move away from income maintenance and toward societal integration to end
the disabled's stigmatization as helpless); DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984)
(adhering to the view that disability is a socially recognized category, rather than an attribute
of individuals, that carries with it social stigma and political privilege). See generally MILBANK
Q. (Supp. 2 1989) (containing a variety of articles discussing disability policy intended to
restore socioeconomic independence).
For a history of the disability rights movement, see generally GARY L. ALBRECHT, THE
DISABILITY BUSINESS: REHABILITATION IN AMERICA (1992) (relating how the development
of social legislation and advanced capitalism jointly address concerns of persons with dis-
abilities); RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY (1984) [hereinafter SCOTCH, TRANSFORMING DISABILITY POLICY]
(discussing how section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 transformed federal policy for
individuals with disabilities by extending them civil rights, beginning with guaranteed access
to federally-funded programs and facilities); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993) (describing how the myths,
fears, and stereotypes of society make having a disability more difficult, and that the new
thinking of those with disabilities is that there is no pity or tragedy in their disability); Rich-
ard K. Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a Social Movement: Advocacy and the Politics of Definition,
44J. Soc. ISSUES 159, 159-72 (1988) [hereinafter Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a Social
Movement].
35. See Telephone Interview with Victor Willi, Executive Director, Center for Inde-
pendent Living of Toronto (Mar. 22, 1994) (on file with author).
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clients' lives.36 Specifically, medical professionals assumed that they
should decide what services people with disabilities needed and the
best way in which to provide them.37
Not surprisingly, people with disabilities sought more control
over their lives, their medical treatments, and their service provid-
ers. They challenged the presumptions that they were sick or
infantile, and that they were incapable of making choices them-
selves.3s Disability rights advocates argued that it was important to
treat people with disabilities as normal, to let them make their own
decisions, and to give them the dignity of risk.39 They maintained
that professionals, like personal care attendants, should work un-
der the direction of disabled people and allow them to set their
own goals and agenda.
To address these problems, disability rights activists used voice
and sought exit options. Some activists engaged in publicized po-
litical protests, such as staging sit-ins at the Department of Health
and Human Services.40 Others lobbied for legislation that would
make public facilities accessible. Still others used lawsuits to en-
force anti-discrimination statutes. 4' A theme of these protests was
that people with disabilities should be able to leave medical and
other institutions that provide services. However, there were no
satisfactory alternatives available. It took voice to create exit op-
tions.
People with disabilities formed self-help groups and independ-
ent living centers. 2 These centers provided social support, helped
36. See ALBRECHT, supra note 34, at 128; SCOTCH, TRANSFORMING DISABILITY POLICY,
supra note 34, at 28.
37. See Interview with Victor Willi, supra note 35.
38. For a discussion of how people with disabilities were segregated and warehoused,
see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
39. See Irving R. Zola, Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy, 67 MILBANK
Q. 401 passim (1989).
40. See generally RICHARD BRYANT TREANOR, WE OVERCAME: THE STORY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS FOR DISABLED PEOPLE (1993).
41. See, e.g., Olmsted v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (mentally disabled pa-
tients brought action against state challenging confinement in a segregated environment);
Albertson, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (former employee, fired from his job as
a truck driver after failing to meet the Department of Transportation's basic vision standards
and not rehired even after obtaining a waiver of the same standards, brought action against
employer); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (HIV-positive patient sued her dentist
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for refusing to treat her); Pennsylvania
Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (state prison inmate sued the Depart-
ment of Corrections under the ADA for denying him admission to a prison boot camp
program due to a history of hypertension).
42. See Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a Social Movement, supra note 34, at 169. Inde-
pendent living allows people with disabilities to control their lives rather than rely on
professionals to provide services and supervision. It breaks relations of dependency and
facilitates living outside of institutions: in communities, in families, or as individuals.
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political organization, and created a community. 43 They varied in
style and approach, but typically people with disabilities provided
the organizational leadership and performed many of the serv-
ices.44 The centers offered counseling, informal networks and
information, and various forms of social support.
Attitudinal change also fostered voice. Rather than apologize for
being different and trying to conform, many disabled people be-
gan to celebrate their differences and wanted society to change its
attitudes and responses.46 This new voice was exercised in the
health care arena as people with disabilities sought to explain their
lives, aspirations, and problems, rather than have professionals
speak for them. This expressive aspect was partly geared toward
political change, and partly toward an effort to assert humanity,
individuality, and community that had long been dormant. This
new attitude also manifested itself in people who demanded that
employers and institutions make accommodations to meet their
needs instead of trying to adapt on their own to institutions.
C. The Two Movements in Perspective
The women's health and the disability rights movements were
social movements with easily identified and organized constituen-
cies. Women were united by their gender. People with disabilities
had long-term health care concerns but did not want to be treated
as patients or to have their problems reduced to medicine. Each
movement had political organizations in place to promote its
health care agenda.
Neither women's groups nor disabilities rights activists viewed
themselves primarily as patients or consumers, yet both used
consumer-oriented strategies to complement their political
organizing. The women's health movement was effective in part
because doctors and hospitals responded to its concerns in an
43. See NANCY CREWE & IRVING K. ZOLA, INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY Dis-
ABLED PEOPLE 43-44 (1983); Irving K Zola, The Politicization of the Self-Help Movement, SoC.
POL'Y, Fall 1987, at 32, 32-33.
44. See generally Irving K. Zola, The Evolution of the Boston Self-Help Center, in A WAY OF
LIFE FOR THE HANDICAPPED 143 (GlenysJones & Norman Tutt eds., 1987).
45. See id.
46. Many of the deaf, for example, speak of a deaf community and culture and rejoice
in their own language. See OLIVER W. SACHS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD
OF THE DEAF 122-23 (1989). Some have resisted efforts to have deaf people speak or lip
read and favor American Sign Language over Sign English, which follows the syntax of Eng-
lish.
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effort to compete and increase their business. Women's groups
used markets by providing medical care information to women, by
rating and referring to selected doctors, and by providing
alternatives to traditional medical care. The disabilities rights
movement promoted the idea that people with disabilities should
not have to rely on the judgment and choices of professionals but
instead should make decisions on their own. This approach often
drew on market and consumer approaches.
Both the women's and disability rights movements played a cen-
tral role in fostering medical consumerism. They championed the
idea that individuals seeking medical care were not always passive
patients but could make choices if given information. They also
claimed that medical consumers had the right to make demands
and set their own standards. They served as a model for a wide ar-
ray of consumer health groups. Activists thought that if consumers
had a greater say in medical care, the health care system would
function better.
Although many of their concerns were focused on issues unique
to their own situations, both groups pressed for reforms that af-
fected all medical consumers. They sought to wrest decision
making authority from medical professionals and medical organi-
zations. They demonstrated that groups receiving services could be
a force for change if they were able to challenge authority collec-
tively and use exit options. Their strengths also illustrated the
difficulties most medical consumers faced. Most consumers are less
able to predict their illnesses and have less need of medical serv-
ices. They have difficulty identifying key concerns and little reason
to become interested in medical issues. They thus lack a rallying
point to exercise effective voice or organized exit.
The concern with increasing the voice of medical consumers, in
part, prompted the idea in the late 1960s that consumers should be
represented in local health planning agencies, whose purpose was
to ration the use of regional resources and to control health care
spending. Federal legislation mandated consumer representation
on health system agencies, a major governmental effort to promote
consumer voice 7.4 However, the health planning process proved
only partially effective in restraining health spending for several
reasons.48 First, local health planning boards did not control
47. See VICTOR G. RODWIN, THE HEALTH PLANNING PREDICAMENT: FRANCE, QUEBEC,
ENGLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES 190-91 (1984) (discussing the 1974 Health Planning
and Resources Act).
48. See id. at 192 (arguing that U.S. health planners and policymakers were unable to
control the costs of health programs and services during the 20-year growth period from the
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s).
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funds. 49 Also, it proved easy for hospitals or groups wanting to build
facilities to mobilize opposition that overrode the health planning
agencies. 50 Finally, consumers were not as effectively organized as
provider groups.
By the end of the 1970s, many questioned the effectiveness of
health planning agencies, and the idea that consumer voice would
be a force for positive change in health policy. The Reagan ad-
ministration finally pulled the plug on federal health planning in
favor of encouraging markets in health care. However, consumer
voice in planning had enduring contributions. It helped change
the political agenda and wrested authority from medical profes-
sionals. Ironically, it also shifted authority from the medical
profession to bureaucracies and organizations.5 The stage was set
for changes in the way our health care system operated.
III. EXIT, VOICE, AND MANAGED CARE
Fast forward to the late 1990s. The American health care system
has changed and so has the use of exit and voice. Managed health
care, once labeled an alternative delivery system, has become the
norm: it has largely replaced indemnity insurance and fee-for-
service practice. While indemnity insurance still exists, it is usually
as managed indemnity insurance, a variation of managed care.
Managed care health plans receive a fixed premium and are re-
sponsible for providing all necessary medical services. Unlike
indemnity insurers of the past, MCOs have tools to control medical
expenditures and incentives to use them. The control occurs in
several ways. Often a primary care physician must authorize refer-
rals to specialists or hospitals and has financial incentives to keep
costs down because he shares part of the cost of referrals. MCOs
also review and can veto elective surgery, expensive medical proce-
dures, and referrals to specialists (so-called utilization review).
Most MCOs restrict patients to a closed panel of doctors and hospi-
tals or make patients pay. higher co-payments if they use medical
49. See id, at 194.
50. See id.
51. See generally MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH, supra note 16 (studying attempts to
foster participatory democracy in American history).
52. These changes have altered financing outside of MCOs as well. For example, hos-
pitals are now paid prospectively by Medicare, rather than per diem or fee-for-service, a
change that turned hospitals, once profit-centers, into cost-centers. See generally Bruce C.
Vladeck, Medicare Hospital Payments by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
576 (1984) (describing the Medicare payment system).
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services outside the network. MCOs also use selective contracting
to obtain lower rates from hospitals and doctors and typically share
with them the financial risk of providing the services.
While patients are vulnerable to poor care in any setting, MCOs
pose two new problems. Their fixed premium per patient and con-
trol over what health services are offered create an incentive to
reduce services, an incentive they frequently pass along to physi-
cians. MCOs exercise control over physicians' clinical choices
through medical protocols and utilization review, reducing the
choices available to doctors and patients. When the organization
performs well, this control can improve the health care of patients.
However, the opposite also can occur.3
Public policy has also changed. Health policy now might be
characterized as halfway managed competition. It relies on exit as a
way to control costs and hold MCOs accountable, although it does
not go as far as proponents of managed competition would like. 4
Alain Enthoven and others introduced their theory of managed
competition over twenty years ago.55 Enthoven's key idea is that the
best way to control health care spending and increase the availabil-
ity and quality of services is to give consumers a choice among
competing MCOs. He acknowledges a need for oversight by pur-
chasers, government, or quasi-public "sponsors" to encourage
competition over price, quality, and service. And he would limit
consumer choice to standardized benefit packages to allow for eas-
ier price and service comparisons. But, for Enthoven, the engines
driving change are financial incentives for individuals to shop for a
health plan that offers the best value. If the performance of an or-
ganization declines, its customers or members will become
53. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 215 (1993).
54. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH
AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24, 27-32 [hereinafter Enthoven, History and Principles] (arguing that
true managed competition occurs where a sponsor offers a menu of many health plans, not
at the individual provider level, because among other things, sponsors can manage enroll-
ment and create price-elastic demand).
55. See ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE
SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980); Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan: A
National-Health-Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 650, 653 (1978); Alain C. Enthoven, History and Principles, supra note 54, at 28;
Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition in Health Care and the Unfinished Agenda, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REv., Supp. 1986, at 105; Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Con-
sumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1 990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote
Quality and Economy (pts. 1 & 2), 320 NEW ENG.J. MED. 29, 29-37 (1989); Alain C. Enthoven
& SaraJ. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 1997, at 26.
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dissatisfied, and their defections to competitors will signal the firm
to clean up its act.
The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act of 197356 re-
quires an annual period of HMO open enrollment to allow
consumers to change providers, although it does not require con-
sumer voice. Federal antitrust law promotes consumer
opportunities for switching providers as a desirable goal. Health
care researchers focus on how consumers choose among compet-
ing MCOs and what kinds of information consumers want and
57need to make effective choices. Consumer groups and others rate
MCOs and issue report cards to facilitate consumer choices. 5 What
does such choice entail? Exiting from one managed care organiza-
tion to another.
Private employers typically allow employees to switch health care
insurance plans on an annual basis. The Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP) also allows employees to switch, by
permitting them to choose among more than 400 health insurance
plans meeting minimum standards. 59 The new MCOs also foster
more choice. The fastest growing types of managed care-
independent practice associations, preferred provider plans, and
point-of-service plans-allow consumers to opt out of the preferred
list of providers if they shoulder greater co-payments. These mod-
els represent a change from the traditional HMOs that limit
services to their own staff physicians.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994).
57. See Kyle L. Grazier et al., Factors Affecting Choice of Health Care Plans, 20 HEALTH
SERV. REs. 659, 662 (1986); Michael S. Klinkman, The Process of Choice of Health Care Plan and
Provider: Development of an Integrated Analytic Framework, 48 MED. CARE REV. 295, 295 (1991);
David Mechanic, Consumer Choice Among Health Insurance Options, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1989,
at 138, 139-40; David Mechanic et al., Choosing Among Health Insurance Options: A Study of New
Employees, 27 INQUIRY 14, 14 (1990); Shoshanna Sofaer & Margo-Lea Hurwicz, When Medical
Group and HMO Part Company: Disenrollment Decisions in Medicare HMOs, 31 MED. CARE 808,
820 (1993). For a summary of law promoting disclosure of information to facilitate con-
sumer choice, see William M. Sage & David Anderson, Health Care Disclosure Requirements, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 185, 185-205 (Alice Gosfield ed., 1997).
58. See Arnold Epstein, Performance Reports on Quality-Prototypes, Problems, and Prospects,
333 NEW ENG.J. MED. 57, 57-58 (1995); Rita Rubin, Rating the HMOs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 2, 1996, at 52, 52-63.
59. See WALTON FRANCIS, CHECKBOOK'S GUIDE TO 1995 HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS FOR
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 4 (1994).
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A. The Limits of Exit
Policy favoring exit is one thing; market reality is another. Will
consumers switch to a competing health plan they prefer? Will they
have genuine alternatives? Most firms-particularly small and mid-
sized ones-offer little choice. In 1996, fifty-two percent of mid-
sized firms offered workers only one plan and only twenty-four
percent offered three or more.0 Also, most employer-sponsored
insurance plans only allow employees to switch once a year. The
poor have few exit options. 1 Some state Medicaid programs lock
beneficiaries into a managed care plan, generally the one with the
lowest premium. Current law allows Medicare beneficiaries to leave
HMOs with thirty days notice, but proposed legislation would limit
changing plans to once a year.62
Clearly a powerful tool for change, exit is limited as an option or
in its effect because of unusual features of medical markets. Own-
ership of MCOs and hospitals is becoming concentrated. If, as
some analysts predict, a few oligopolies soon dominate the market,
they may become complacent about the risk of losing market share
63
and less responsive to consumer switching. Albert Hirschman also
warns about what he calls "lazy monopoly" or collusive behavior.64 A
firm in a restricted market may choose to be rid of its difficult cus-
tomers rather than change its behavior. Dissatisfied customers will
only be able to switch to an equally unresponsive competitor if a
problem is endemic among all rival health plans. Most perverse of
all, MCOs may prefer to lose subscribers with high-cost illnesses
because, due to fixed premiums, their exit is the organization's
gain. Under these circumstances, the threat of exit will not en-
courage improved performance.
60. See Telephone Interview with John Gable, Co-Director of Health Care National
Consulting, Center for Survey Research (Apr. 19, 1998) (describing the KPMG Peat Marwick
publication of Health Benefits in 1996) (on file with author).
61. See Shelley I. White-Means, Consumer Information, Insurance, and Doctor Shopping: The
Elderly Consumer's Perspective, 23J. CONSUMER AFF. 45, 45 (1989).
62. See H.R. 2491, 103d Cong., ch. 1, § 8001, pt. C, § 1851(e)(3) (1993). There are
sound reasons for this policy. If people can switch between plans at will, they may first opt
for a low-cost plan with limited benefits until they need a service and then jump to a high-
cost plan that provides it. But if the premium rates of different plans reflect the health of
their subscribers, the market will reward plans that are good at avoiding sick people, rather
than plans that are good at treating them.
63. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 429, 442
(1982); Richard Kronick et a., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic Limita-
tions of Managed Competition, 328 NEw ENG.J. MED. 148, 149 (1993).
64. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 57-60 (1970).
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MCOs intentionally give consumers fewer exit options than tra-
ditional insurance.6" They restrict patient choice of doctors and
other providers to a closed network or offer patients significant
financial incentives to use preferred providers. Even when avail-
able, exit often has limited value. Switching physicians within a
plan may amount to no choice among clinical alternatives because
MCOs regulate the clinical decisions of all their physicians through
financial incentives and organizational rules.
Switching to another provider, in or out of a plan, may also
mean severing an established patient-physician relationship. Exit is
especially difficult for patients with chronic or complex conditions
that require coordination among medical personnel or particular
knowledge of the case. Especially for the sick and the frail, shop-
ping for medical care may be physically and emotionally difficult. 6
Exit in medical care is most useful as a last resort. If a managed
care organization's performance is mediocre but not bad enough
to make consumers willing to leave, patients may simply endure
lower quality.
Exit is a crude tool because managed care is a bundle of varied
medical services, medical providers, and health insurance. Con-
sider a family of three, each with different medical problems: the
father with a cardiac problem, the mother with breast cancer, and
the child with asthma. Suppose that the family must choose among
three MCOs, each of which is strong in only one area of medical
care that the family needs.67 Which MCO should the family choose?
B. Consumer Voice as External Influences on
Managed Care Organizations
After some health maintenance organizations cut hospital ma-
ternity stays to a maximum of twenty-four hours as a cost saving
measure, the caption of one editorial cartoon read "HMOs: Heav-
ing Mom Out" with an image of a mother in a catapult hospital
bed.6s Then the press learned that MCOs had contract clauses,
65. See Marc. A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 604, 605
(1995).
66. SeeJudith H. Hibbard & Edward C. weeks, Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence
and Predictors, 25 MED. CARE 1019, 1028 (1987).
67. See Klein, Models of Man, supra note 2, at 416-29 (1980).
68. See Dan Wasserman, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 1995 (on file with author). For
an analysis and data on why shorter maternity stays save very little money, see Ming Tai-Seale
et al., Drive-Through Delivery: Where Are the "Savings"?, 56 MED. CARE REs. & REv. 30, 30-46
(1999).
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dubbed "gag rules," that barred doctors from making critical
comments about the organization to their patients, discussing un-
authorized treatment options, or disclosing how they were paid.
On its cover Time magazine pictured a doctor gagged with a surgi-
cal mask.69
Market theory suggests that if enough consumers had wanted
longer maternity stays than were standard, at least some MCOs
would have catered to their wishes to lure them away from com-
petitors. That did not happen. However, federal and state
legislators, Republicans as well as Democrats, fell over each other
to deliver what the market did not.70 As of 1995, sixteen states es-
tablished standards for maternity length of hospital.7' Similarly, by
1995 fifteen states had prohibited gag clauses72 and in 1996 Con-
gress considered legislation that would have outlawed them
entirely
7 3
However, legislatures do not always respond to consumers.
Producers are generally better organized and have concentrated
interests and resources, and legislatures respond to them more
frequently. Much recent consumer protection legislation regulat-
ing managed care has been successful because consumer groups
69. See TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at cover. There is controversy over what constitutes a "gag
clause" or whether they exist. A General Accounting Office report found no gag clauses in
contracts it reviewed. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-97-175, MANAGED
CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS
(1997). However, there were many other clauses that may chill voice, and much turns on
how one defines a gag clause. HMO industry leaders cite the GAO report as evidence that
the press made up the controversy about gag clauses without any evidence. See also Karen M.
Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution: The Media and Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb.
1998, at 26, 28-29. Prior to the controversy, however, several MCOs told doctors not to tell
patients about treatment options before the utilization review committee authorized them,
See MOLINA MEDICAL CARE CENTER PROVIDER CARE MANUAL, KNox-KEENE LICENSE APPLI-
CATION exhibit I-6P:0284-7, Department of Corporations, Sacramento, California (1993) (on
file with author), or that they should not disclose their contractual risk-sharing financial
arrangements, see Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Cor-
porate Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1706-08 (1995) [hereinafter
Woolhandler & Himmelstein, Extreme Risk].
70. See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1115 (1999) [hereinafter Rodwin, Backlash].
71. SeeGeorgeJ. Annas, Women and Children First, 333 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1647, 1648-49
(1995); FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, HMO CONSUMERS AT RISK: STATES TO THE RESCUE 2
(1996) [hereinafter FAMILIES USA, STATES TO THE RESCUE] (finding that 25 states had set
such standards by mid-1996).
72. See FAMILIES USA, STATES TO THE RESCUE, supra note 71, at 2.
73. For example, Representative Greg Ganske (R-IA) introduced to the 104th Con-
gress H.R. 2976, The Patient Right to Know Act, which would have prohibited MCOs from
interfering in doctor-patient communications.
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formed coalitions between physicians and other health care
providers.4
Consumers cannot depend solely on legislation when markets
fail. Enacting legislation is costly and insensitive to individual
circumstances-not a desirable or feasible means for consumers to
express their everyday wishes. Special circumstances made it easier
to enact limits on drive-through deliveries than to get action on
other consumer issues. Maternity is, well, a motherhood issue. Gag
rules, too, threatened to deny all consumers enrolled in managed
care the opportunity to hear information about alternative
treatments. In both cases, the problem was visible and easily
understood, and the number of potential beneficiaries was large
and easily organized.
75Gag rules highlight the limited options for consumer voice.
Managed care plans wrote such clauses to restrict the flow of nega-
tive information about their policies from physicians to patients in
76the hope of decreasing consumer exit to competitors. They
sought to chill physician speech and thereby repress potential con-
sumer complaints. Because the clauses may never have been legally
enforceable, their prohibition may do little to allay the underlying
public concern. When the contracts of troublesome physicians ex-
pire, managers of health plans can simply refuse to renew them,
rendering anti-gag clause legislation ineffective. 7 Legislation pro-
hibiting MCOs from suppressing physician and consumer voice will
not be sufficient.
Consumer voice must be expressed in other public forms which
affect MCOs. 7s There are several possibilities. Employers often pool
their purchasing power and form cooperatives that contract with
MCOs. Rather than simply negotiate over price, the cooperatives
have formed long-term working relationships with MCOs. The co-
operatives gather information on what they want and on how
MCOs work. The purchasers then tell MCOs what they want the
MCOs to provide, discuss details of how the MCOs might operate
differently, and ultimately put their wishes in a contract with per-
formance measures and incentives to encourage the services
74. See generally Rodwin, Backlash, supra note 70. For an analysis of consumer protection
and managed care, see Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform
Proposals, and Trade-offs, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1319, 1381 (1986).
75. See Wendy K. Mariner, Managed-Care Gag Cheats the Patients, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 1996,
at A19.
76. See generallyJagdip Singh, Voice, Exit, and Negative Word-of-Mouth Behaviors: An Inves-
tigation Across Three Service Categories, 18 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 1 (1990) [hereinafter,
Singh, Voice, Exit].
77. See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, Extreme Risk, supra note 69, at 1706-08.
78. See RODWIN, CONSUMER VOICE, supra note 5, at 4-6, 16-23.
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purchasers seek. 9 Such voice, combined with purchasing power,
has become a major force in changing how MCOs operate. How-
ever, the concerns of consumers/employees are not formally
represented in purchasing cooperatives, because the cooperatives
represent employers. Employees could be heard, however, if they
worked through unions or were represented in other ways in pur-
chasing cooperatives.
There are other institutions that influence or oversee MCOs,
and these too could be leveraged to bolster consumer voice. For
example, voluntary accrediting organizations, such as the National
Committee on Quality Assurance, set standards for MCOs. ° Simi-
larly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafts
model state laws, which often influence state policy. These organi-
zations now have enormous influence on how MCOs operate. A
greater consumer presence in these organizations would affect
standard practices of MCOs across the country. Most accrediting
organizations have consumer representatives on advisory commit-
tees. Generally, however, provider groups greatly outnumber
consumers. There is, also, very little in the way of funding to sup-
port consumer advocates or institutional means to hold the
representatives accountable to consumers.
C. Consumer Voice Within Managed Care Organizations
Voice within MCOs has advantages that voice external to MCOs
lacks. Voice can focus on problems of the individual MCO and
facilitate experimentation. Consumers might be more willing to
get involved in local MCOs and institutions than in regional or
national organizations. Yet, today, consumers have very few
opportunities to express voice within MCOs. Public policy could
promote the use of voice to change this situation. State or federal
government should focus on creating incentives for MCOs to
79. See Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: The Need for Organized
Consumers, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 110, 119-20.
80. See National Committee for Quality Assurance, NCQA HEDIS 2000 Data Submission
(last modified Dec. 23, 1999) <http://www.ncqa.org/pages/policy/hedis/00sub.html> (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); National Committee for Quality
Assurance, Accreditation (last modified Dec. 23, 1999) <http://www.ncqa.org/pages/
policy/accredidation/mco/acred497.htm> (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
1060 [VOL. 32:4
Exit and Voice in American Health Care
develop mechanisms that would make it easier for consumers to
exercise their voice.8
Well-run MCOs make an effort to find out what their consumers
want. Consumer satisfaction surveys are a form of voice. Like polls
in electoral politics, they shape how leadership responds to the
public, and perhaps even displace traditional forms of voice such
as protest and complaint. Consumer satisfaction surveys have led
MCOs to increase the hours for appointments with physicians, to
train medical personnel in communicating and empathizing with
patients, and to create new ways of compensating physicians to re-
ward their contribution to consumer satisfaction.
Not surprisingly, however, managers typically undertake con-
sumer surveys more for internal use or public relations than for
addressing consumer concerns. 2 The information can bolster the
MCOs' control by helping them to respond preemptively to prob-
lems. Managers can disclose results that show the organization in a
good light and keep other data confidential. In short, consumer
satisfaction surveys are not the instruments of consumers; consum-
ers have no role in developing or analyzing the surveys or in
disseminating the results.
Albert Hirschman distinguishes between vertical voice
(individuals privately and separately expressing themselves to the
organization's management) and horizontal voice (organized dis-
cussions and activities of consumers or employees) . Each kind
requires different channels. Many people become concerned with
policy only when it affects them directly. These people often re-
spond initially through grievance. Grievance is direct, tied to
individual concerns, and often produces results quickly. By and
large, consumers in managed care have options to exercise vertical
voice by filing complaints or by appealing denials of services. Some
problems, however, require changes in policy or even a consumer
role in governance. Consumers have little leverage through hori-
zontal voice, which might affect organizational governance.
81. See Lena Kolarska & Howard Aldrich, Exit, Voice, and Silence: Consumers' and Manag-
ers" Responses to Organizational Decline, 1 ORG. STUD. 41, 57 (1980) [hereinafter Kolarska &
Aldrich, Exit, Voice, and Silence].
82. See id.
83. See ALBERT O. HIRSC- MAN, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of
Recent Contributions, in RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY 77, 82-83 (1986).
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D. Grievances
Most managed care plans have grievance procedures.14 Except
for Medicare HMOs, however, there are no uniform standards in
force and consumer groups have found existing procedures defi-
cient.15 Most complaints today are reviewed solely by the MCOs. In
effect, the consumer seeks redress from an interested source that
creates its own policies about what services should be provided.
Many consumer groups and legislative proposals, therefore,
would allow a patient to appeal to a neutral, independent party
when his or her doctor or MCO decides that a medical service is
816
unnecessary or inappropriate . The President's Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in Health Care
has recommended that consumers have a right to have their
appeals reviewed by an external source. 7 By executive order
President Clinton has mandated that all federal programs comply
with these recommendations.8s This is already the practice for
appeals in the Medicare program, where an independent group,
the Center for Health Care Dispute Resolution, reviews all appeals
under a contract with the Health Care Financing Administration. s°
The American Association for Health Plans, the managed care
trade association, publicly recommended that its member plans
adopt binding independent review of patient appeals.9 ° Many
MCOs already have an independent organization choose neutral
84. See Proposed ERISA Claims Procedures Regulation Before the Department of Labor (Feb. 18,
1999) (testimony of tie Special Comm. on Health Ins. of the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs)
(last modified Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.naic.org/Inews/testimonies/990218test.htm>
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing extant and pro-
posed grievance regulations and noting that all 50 states require at least a one-step review).
85. See Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations:
Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1674, 1708
(1994) [hereinafter Stayn, Securing Access].
86. See, e.g., The Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of 1997, H.R. 1415, 105th
Cong. § 2 (1997).
87. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE HEALTH
CARE INDUS., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1997).
88. See Memorandum on Federal Agency Compliance with the Patient Bill of Rights,
34 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 298, 298-99 (Feb. 20, 1998).
89. See Center for Health Dispute Resolution: Medicare Reconsideration Review Program (last
modified Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.healthappeal.com/medicare.htm> (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
90. See Role of Government in Regulating Health Insurance Plans Before the United States Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee (Mar. 11, 1999) (statement of Karen M. Ignagni,
President and CEO, American Association of Health Plans) (visited OcL 23, 1999) <http://
www.aahp.org/services/government&advocacy/policy/testimony/REG99WND.htm> (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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experts outside the organization to review appeals from denial of
experimental therapy or organ transplants.9
Review of appeals by neutral decision makers is necessary, but
not sufficient, to give consumers a fair hearing. There should also
be some kind of institutionalized advocacy. Organizations have re-
sources and expertise on how to handle grievances. Individuals
lack such expertise and resources and go through a grievance pro-
cedure infrequently; all of this places them at a disadvantage. 9
Experienced specialized advocates can address the disparity, but
not fully.
93
Grievance procedures, in most contexts, are not widely used by
patients with problems. Consumers are often reluctant to complain
or file grievances,94 especially for medical care.95 One study found
that only one-third of consumers with complaints voiced them,
complaints were resolved to the patient's satisfaction only a third of
the time, and consumers' complaints in medicine were resolved
less satisfactorily than seven other service categories surveyed.96
To help alleviate this problem, there should be protection for
individuals who initiate a grievance and prompt, visible penalties
against the organization if it retaliates. It would also be helpful for
independent parties or an ombuds to conduct surveys of health
care consumers and find out what problems they have.
Independent parties are more apt than MCOs to design their
91. See Sharon Bernstein & Alissa J. Rubin, State HMOs Will Allow Independent Appeals,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (describing how HMO members of the California Associa-
tion of Health Plans adopted use of independent panels); Milt Freudenheim, Aetna to Allow
Outside Review of Care Denials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at C3.
92. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903, 925 (Cal. 1997); Lisa Bing-
ham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y
J. 189, 190-97 (1997).
93. See Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 118 (1974).
94. See ARTHUR BEST, WHEN CONSUMERS COMPLAIN 4 (1981); Alan R. Andreasen, Con-
sumer Complaints and Redress: What We Know and What We Don't Know, in THE FRONTIER OF
RESEARCH IN THE CONSUMER INTEREST 675, 675 (E. Scott Maynes & ACCI Research Com-
mittee eds., 1988); Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 701, 701 (1977);Jane Kolodinsky, Complaints, Redress, and Subsequent Purchases of Medical
Services by Dissatisfied Consumers, 16J. CONSUMER POL'Y 193, 195 (1993);Jagdip Singh, Indus-
try Characteristics and Consumer Dissatisfaction, 25 J. CONSUMER ArT. 19, 23-25 (1991); Rex H.
Warland et al., Dissatisfied Consumers: Who Gets Upset and Who Takes Action, 9J. CONSUMER AlT.
148, 151 (1975).
95. See Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Satisfaction in Loose Monopolies: The Case of Medical
Care, 2J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 122, 131 (1983);Jagdip Singh, Determinants of Consumers'
Decisions to Seek Third Party Redress: An Empirical Study of Dissatisfied Patients, 23 J. CONSUMER
AF. 329, 329 (1989).
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University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
surveys in ways that will reveal critical comments. Their surveys also
are more likely to reveal unsuspected problems, allow comparison
across health plans, and identify flaws undetected by a formal
97grievance process.
Grievance mechanisms are usually designed to resolve individual
complaints. Managers often placate individuals who voice
complaints-making exceptions to policy or working out some
special accommodation-rather than deal with the source of the
problems that affect the complainers and the silent alike.98 Indeed,
firms may use grievance mechanisms as an escape valve for angry
consumers who might otherwise complain to public authorities or
other consumers."
Although complaints can be harbingers of systematic organiza-
tional problems, MCOs rarely analyze complaints to identify
problems and even less frequently inform the public about them.'00
Publicizing the kind and number of complaints and appeals for
services denied and how they were resolved would spur organiza-
tional change. Funding an ombuds or independent groups to
prepare summaries and analyses of complaints and to disseminate
the information would help spotlight problems and focus the at-
tention of management.
Facilitating consumer voice through complaints is important. Yet
many problems are systemic or are not well addressed by individual
complaints. The consumer voice in management and daily opera-
tions must be strengthened. Employees should be able to
collectively voice and represent their views in organizational policy
and governance. One way to do this is to ensure that information
from consumer complaints affects organizational policy, not just
the resolution of individual cases. A second way is to provide for
consumer representation at appropriate levels in MCOs and in
groups that contract with MCOs or that oversee their performance.
A third way is to ensure that information from consumer com-
plaints reaches the press, policymakers, and consumer groups.
Dissemination of information about complaints to shareholders,
prospective members, and the press would create public pressure
on MCOs to respond to consumers and would prevent complaints
97. Cf Lena Kolarska & Howard Aldrich, Exit, Voice, and Silence, supra note 81, at 54
(describing the effect of independent Polish media in causing managers of Polish organiza-
tions to create more efficient behavior).
98. See Singh, Voice, Exit, supra note 76, at 3.
99. Cf RUDOLF KLEIN, COMPLAINTS AGAINST DOCTORS 121-34 (1973) (describing
Britain's system of dealing with complaints).
100. See Telephone Interview with Membership Services Department, Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound (Mar. 1997) (on file with author).
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from being buried in files. Exit and voice then would complement
each other. Prospective enrollees might choose MCOs based on
how they addressed complaints, which in turn would encourage
management to resolve problems. Members might publish summa-
ries of complaints in a newsletter, informing individuals with
similar problems and facilitating the formation of groups to ad-
dress common concerns. State insurance departments could then
provide more intelligent oversight of MCOs.
E. Governance
Not-for-profit health care organizations are governed by boards
that broadly represent the community, including consumers. To be
sure, trustees in not-for-profits are usually nominated and chosen
by management, which makes them less than ideal representatives
of consumers. Although many not-for-profits behave like for-
profits, others have pursued community missions and interests that
a profit-oriented organization would probably not undertake. With
for-profit MCOs growing in number and size, even this indirect
form of consumer participation in governance is fading.
In light of problems with current health care markets and the
disillusionment with traditional governmental regulation, con-
sumer participation in governance ought to get another look.
Because owners can govern, consumers might form cooperatives to
own MCOs (orjointly own them with other groups) and elect their
own trustees and management. Co-ops could require consumer
approval for key management choices and strategic planning. The
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound is an example. Operat-
ing since 1947 as a cooperative jointly owned by physicians and
consumers, it now serves more than half a million members and is
considered an exemplary consumer-oriented HMO.0 °
Nevertheless, maintaining consumer involvement is difficult,
even in cooperatives. Today, about six percent of individuals in-
sured by Group Health are co-op members with voting rights.
Voting in elections has been around five percent for most of the
last decade, but because of controversial issues in the last two years,
turnout has been around fifteen percent. Since 1989, less than one
percent have attended the annual meetings that determine what
101. See WALT CROWLEY, To SERVE THE GREATEST NUMBER: A HISTORY OF GROUP
HEALTH COOPERATIVE OF PUGET SOUND, at ix, 16-18, 222 (1996).
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goes on the ballot.1 0 2 Most consumers simply do not have the time
or inclination to become involved in governance.03 Consumers at-
tempting to start a cooperative HMO today would face immense
hurdles, particularly in raising capital and obtaining contracts with
large firms. Even Group Health has had to form an alliance with
Kaiser Permanente in order to compete for contracts with multi-
state employers.
There are, nonetheless, possibilities for injecting consumer voice
even in for-profit MCOs. For-profit MCOs could create advisory
boards for specific issues as they arose, or consumer councils for
ongoing and long-term advice and feedback.0 4 Councils could ex-
press their views on issues that affect members and work with
management to improve the organization's performance. 
10 5
Both for-profit and nonprofit MCOs could also include con-
sumer representatives on boards that performed important
functions, or have boards report to consumer representatives. For
example, MCOs could create oversight boards operating in a man-
ner similar to independent auditors for financial institutions or
inspector generals for government agencies. Other boards could
address issues of management operations.
CONCLUSION
Today, the main problems MCOs face are the absence of effec-
tive consumer voice and over-reliance on exit. This may change if
consumer voice is increased. Too much consumer voice may create
other problems in managed care. Consumers might demand too
many services or slight budget requirements. They might also poli-
ticize and polarize issues and impede efficiency. Consumers may be
uninformed about medical, administrative, or policy issues. Efforts
to cater to them may introduce irrationalities into organizational
planning. MCOs' efforts to meet the demands of multiple con-
sumer groups might mean that their main objectives lose
102. SeeJames A. Morone & Theodore R. Marmor, Representing Consumer Interests: The
Case of American Health Planning, 91 ETHICS 431, 448-49 (1981).
103. SeeStarr, Changing the Balance of Power, supra note 2, at 168.
104. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 103-06
(1984); Richard B. Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure,
Quits, and Separations, 94 Q.J. ECON. 643, 645-46 (1980) (finding that when a grievance sys-
tem is in place in the union environment, workers are likely to seek a solution through the
procedure before quitting).
105. See Sidney Verba, Democratic Participation, 373 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC,.
53, 57-58 (1967).
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coherence. If there are significant efforts to increase consumer
voice these problems will have to be faced.
Increasing consumer voice in our health care system would, to
be sure, often be cumbersome and annoying to managers and
medical personnel. However, consumer voice could help build
stronger organizations by putting managers in touch with the ex-
periences and desires of their customers, the patients. If those
customers become sufficiently discontented, they will eventually
call on legislatures to act on their behalf. The spate of consumer
protection legislation regulating managed care suggests that the
industry will face increasing constraints, that voice suppressed or
ignored within MCOs will merely shift the forum in which voice is
expressed. Those who claim that increased consumer voice within
MCOs is impractical should contemplate the alternatives.

